CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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	regard to the Western powers. The new shifts in Malenkov's policy conform fully to Stalin's thesis and Malenkov's own thesis announced during the 19th Party Congress.
4. 25X1	The reasons which probably influenced this shift by the Soviet leaders even during Stalin's lifetime were provided in part by Soviet domestic policy problems and in part by foreign policy problems (assuming that the suppositions made in this report are correct). It appears that Stalin had come to realize that his policy of keeping the West constantly in a state of alarm and harassment, instead of causing the West to disintegrate, actually had unified it. The very serious problems which divided the Western powers (for example, the German question between France and the other Western powers), the problems arising out of the US-British differences in connection with the question of world influence, many other problems in Europe and the Far East, which the USSR could use to divide the West, all this became of secondary importance in the face of the cold war promoted by the Soviet Union. The West forgot the Saar question, Britain forgot or pretended to forget US competition in her markets, France allowed the US to build military bases in North Africa, Australia and the Philippines accepted the idea of Japan's rearmament, and all this was possible because the West's primary problem was the necessity to defend itself from probable Soviet armed aggression. For this same reason, the US invested billions of dollars in economic aid and weapons for the countries that had alighed themselves with the US to meet the eventuality of war against the Soviet threat. the Soviet leaders had recognized their error with regard to the cold war even before Stalin's death, and that
	they had decided to shift to this new phase of "cold friendship" for the disintegration of the West.
5.	Another cause of Soviet preoccupation was the situation in the Satellites and China. The continuous and drastic purges in the Satellites show that the USSR never succeeded in completely taming the "Pepples' Democracies". In past months there have been very evident signs of the more or less chaotic situation prevailing in many parts of the USSR itself. It appears that Stalin himself had decided to attach special importance during this period to reinforcing Soviet power in the USSR and in the Satellites.
6.	groups fighting among themselves for Stalin's succession. In addition to the official announcements that Zhdanov's death was not due to natural causes (this has been denied officially only by the Malenkov government), there
25X1	are irrefutable proofs
.7.	Malenkov ordered the release and rehabilitation of the "confessed assassins" and the arrest of their accusers, on whom Stalin had bestowed the highest honors and decorations of the USSR. It is probable that the doctors were innocent, but that, despite their innocence, Malenkov had every interest in preventing light from being shed on Zhdanov's death. It was also noted that, immediately after Stalin's death, Malenkov carried out a radical (and not at all constitutional) reshuffling of high Government and Party leaders.
NEV/4	Nothing in particular is known about differences between the USSR and China. However,
25X1	a serious misunderstanding between Moscow and Peiping in connection with the war in Korea and the entire Asian policy. MAO Tse Tung's absence at Moscow was also noted, Malenkov's appointment of V.V. Kuznetsov as ambassador to Peiping. It is known that in a few days the Soviet and Chinese Communist governments will hold an important meeting proposed by Malenkov personally. It appears that MAO is turning to the policy of
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"peaceful coexistence" in Asia in an attempt to destroy politically (something that is not impossible) Chiang's Nationalist Government and become a UN member. It appears that MAO was not satisfied with the policy imposed on him by Stalin, a policy which called for Communist China to be "defended" and represented at international meetings by Soviet diplomats. Moreover, it is believed that at this time Malenkov does not wish to make an enemy of MAO and that he has promised to support Communist China's policy in exchange for Chinese promises of closer collaboration between Moscow and Peiping. However, we have learned that nothing specific has been decided thus far regarding close collaboration between Moscow and Peiping and that details of such a collaboration will be discussed during the weeks to come.

a.	These reasons, both domestic and international in character
	These reasons, both domestic and international in character had compelled Stalin to contemplate a change in tactics in his foreign had compelled Stalin to contemplate a change in tactics in his foreign policy. For the same reasons, Malenkov is even more compelled to change these policy. Stalin had a myth in his favor. Malenkov, to strengthen his position, tactics. Stalin had a myth in his favor. Malenkov, to strengthen his position, needs a long period of prudent domestic policy and very prudent foreign policy. The these reasons, "peaceful" proposals made by the USSR and China to the West are substantially sincere and can be implemented at once, but that these proposals do not mean that Malenkov intends to deviate from the "Stalinist orthodoxy". He needs more
	the among alog the muth of "leader" and needs also to continue the organization
	Communist world the policy of the USSR as a model state.
10. 25X1 25X1	It is also quite probable that, by extending his hand to the West, Malenkov hopes to draw the West into negotiations in which each of the participants would make some concessions to the other. Now, any obtained for the USSR would enhance his popularity and contribute to the creation of the Malenkov myth. While price reductions in the USSR enhance Malenkov's popularity at home, any concession that he can obtain in foreign policy will enhance his prestige not only on the domestic plane, but also on the Cominform international plane.
25X1 ₁₁ .	due Chalinia idealogies but his govern-
25X1	Malenkov is not destroying Stalin's ideologies, but his governmental apparatus, to set up one of his Malenkov's own, and that he is mental apparatus, to set up one of his This is something which cannot be
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25X1 25X1 25X1	striving also to create his own myth. This is a striving also to create his own myth. In the status of "operation Malenkov" accomplished in a year or two. However, the status of "operation Malenkov" cannot be determined at this time. At least a few months must pass before we can estimate the direction and world impact of the new Soviet leader's policy.

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